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Insurance-Duty to Defend-Alleged Facts Not Within
Policy Coverage
D issued to P an automobile liability insurance policy. The
policy provided coverage for injury to any person while using insured's automobile with his permission but excluded from coverage
injury to any employee of the insured arising out of and in the
course of such employment. D agreed to defend any suit against
the insured alleging injury within policy coverage, even if such suit
was groundless, false or fraudulent. A collision occured while C
was operating P's automobile with his permission. L, a passenger in
the automobile at the time of the accident, instituted an action against
P for injuries received as a result of the collision. L alleged that
she and C were employees of P at the time of the collision. Upon
these facts, D refused to defend P in the suit because of the employee
exclusion. P contended that they were independent contractors. The
court found that C and L were not P's employees, and P was dismissed as a party defendant. P demanded of D reimbursement for
the expenses and reasonable attorney's fees incurred in defending the
suit. P's petition was dismissed. Held, reversed. When the complaint
against the insured alleges untrue facts placing the claim within an
exception in the policy, but the true facts, known or ascertainable
to the insurer, are within coverage, the insurer is obligated to defend
the suit. Loftin v. United States Fire Ins. Co., 127 S.E.2d 53 (Ga.
App. 1962).
Concern here is not with the insurer's ultimate liability to reimburse for the injuries covered by the policy but rather for the insurer's duty to defend the insured against actions for damages
arising from such injuries even if the action is groundless, false or
fraudulent. "If the allegations of the complaint state a cause of
action within the coverage of the policy the insurance company must
defend." Boyle v. National Cas. Co., 84 A.2d 614, 615 (D.C. Munic.
Ct. App. 1951). Such a rule advises the insurer at the institution of
the suit that his duty to defend exists. Difficulty arises, however,
when the allegations in the pleadings state facts which bring the
injury within the exception in the policy, and these facts are in
contradiction to the true facts known or ascertainable to the insurer
which bring the injury within the policy coverage. The issue then
presented is whether the insurer's duty to defend is to be determined
by the plaintiff's allegations alone or by those facts not in the allegation which show policy coverage. It appears that this issue has never
been decided in the courts of West Virginia.
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The decisions of the American jurisdictions are not uniform with
regard to this issue. The court in the principal case made a statement
recognizing that some courts in other jurisdictions have taken the
view that the allegations alone determine the insurer's duty to defend.
It appears that the majority view is in accord with that interpretation. See generally, Annot., 50 A.L.R.2d 458, 497 (1956) and cases
thereunder; Comment, 30 N. Y. U. L. REv. 1019 (1955); Comment,
103 U. PA. L. REV. 445 (1954). Ohio, Pennsylvania and Virginia
appear to follow the majority view. Lessak v. Metropolitan Cas. Ins.
Co., 168 Ohio St. 153, 151 N.E.2d 730 (1958); Wilson v. Maryland
Cas. Co., 377 Pa. 588, 105 A.2d 304 (1954); London Guarantee &
Accident Co. v. White & Bros., 188 Va. 195, 49 S.E.2d 254 (1948).
The effect of these decisions is, in the majority view, to allow
the insurer to ignore the true facts which are not alleged but which
are available to him and to rely solely upon the injured party's
allegations when determining the existence of his duty to defend.
The reasoning behind this view seems to be that the insurer should
not be obligated to defend a suit against the insured when the insurer
would be under no duty to pay the judgment if the allegations prevail.
Lessak v. Metropolitan Cas. Ins. Co., supra; Ocean Accident &
Guarantee Corp. v. Washington Brick & Terra Cotta Co., 148 Va.
829, 139 S.E. 517 (1927). This view is termed "more logical" by the
author in Annot., 50 A.L.R.2d 458, 497 (1956), apparently because
the insurance company can immediately determine its duty to defend.
In recognizing those jurisdictions which are in accord with the
principal case and opposed to the majority view, Mr. Appleman
states that "the insurer may thus be under a duty to investigate the
facts, even where the complaint, on its face, indicates that the claim
against the insured falls outside the policy coverage." 7A APPLEMAN,
INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE § 4683 at 442, 443 (1962). The
basis of this view, according to the principal case, is that the parties
did not intend to allow the insurer to ignore the true facts and to
place the burden on the insured to prove coverage already known
to the insurer. The decision in the principal case does eliminate one
possible hardship which may be placed upon the insured under the
majority view. If, under the majority view, the injured party has
more than one theory upon which to base his claim and he chooses
to allege that theory which does not show policy coverage, the insurer
is relieved of his obligation to defend even though the injured party
did have a claim which would show coverage and if alleged would
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obligate the insurer to defend. The view of the principal case would
require the insurer to investigate such facts and to defend the insured
when they exist even though the injured party did not allege them.
The minority view places importance upon the intent of the
parties and grants to each policy holder the assurance that the insurer
will make every reasonable inquiry in order to establish his duty
to defend. The majority view, on the other hand, grants to the insurer a definite basis upon which he may determine his duty
to defend and if the facts do not fall within this basis, the duty does
not exist. When considering the great number of arm's length
transactions entered into by insurance companies today, the majority
view would eliminate the expense and time involved in investigation
for each policy holder under the minority view.
While the decision in the principal case and the decisions of
those jurisdictions with which it is in accord may carry weight in a
future West Virginia litigation, the majority view cannot be overlooked. The principal case does illustrate that its view can be competently argued and may prevail. Which of these views West Virginia counsel may wish to adopt shall probably be determined, as a
practical matter, by whether his client is the insurer or the insured.
The preferred view, with regard to the West Virginia law, will have
to be determined by the court.
Charles David McMunn

Insurance-Release-Recission for Mutual Mistake--Existing
but Unknown Injury as Grounds Therefor
P received a bruised knee in an automobile accident. She did
not consult a doctor, but signed a general release for consideration,
ostensibly covering damages to the vehicle and all injuries "known
at this time or which may hereafter develop." P subsequently discovered that she had suffered a serious knee fracture, and instituted
an action for damages. D asserted the release as an affirmative defense, and P prayed for recission. The trial court entered judgment
for D. Held, reversed. The evidence clearly established that the release was executed under a mutual mistake as to an existing but unknown injury which was not intended by either party to be covered
by the release. Dansby v. Buck, 373 P.2d 1 (Ariz. 1962).
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